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Abstract 
Though the ability of human beings to deal with 
probabilities has been put into question, the assessment of 
rarity is a crucial competence underlying much of human 
decision-making and is pervasive in spontaneous narrative 
behaviour. This paper proposes a new model of rarity and 
randomness assessment, designed to be cognitively 
plausible. Intuitive randomness is defined as a function of 
structural complexity. It is thus possible to assign 
probability to events without being obliged to consider the 
set of alternatives. The model is tested on Lottery 
sequences and compared with subjects‟ preferences. 
Introduction: Cognition and Probability 
There seems to be an irreducible divorce between 
mathematical probability and human abilities to estimate 
odds. Various studies in psychology have revealed 
spectacular biases that seem to prove that human beings 
do not have a genuine consistent competence in 
probability. For instance, the gambler‟s fallacy induces 
individuals to avoid betting on tail when tossing a coin if 
tails have been drawn several times in a row, as if the coin 
was expected now to fall on face to restore balance 
(Terrell 1994). Another error, on which much has been 
written, is known as the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1983). It consists in considering more likely 
that Linda, an anti-war militant female student, be found a 
few years later to be (a) a bank teller and militant 
feminist, rather than (b) a bank teller (without further 
precision). Normally, the latter case should be considered 
more probable, as it includes the former. A third famous 
error, called base-rate fallacy, consists in inferring 
probability from immediate evidence without taking a 
priori rarity into account, as when someone is sure to be 
ill when a biological test with less that 1% error says so, 
though that person has 33% chances to be in good health 
if the illness concerns only 2% of the population (Evans 
1990). Moreover, people are over-sensitive to data 
presented as concrete and close and tend to ignore 
frequency statements (Nisbett & Ross 1980). 
Though it can be argued that such errors are unlikely to 
show in everyday life and need artificial testing situations 
to be revealed, they still seem to dismiss any possibility 
that human cognition involve a true competence in 
probability. 
The problem is not only on the cognitive side. By 
various aspects, classical mathematical probability theory 
is unable to provide an acceptable theoretical frame for 
the corresponding cognitive abilities. Let us mention two 
reasons for this. 
First, there are several cognitive modes of access to 
probability that are artificially conflated into one single 
concept through axiomatics and measure theory. One is 
symmetry: we feel compelled to assign a probability of 
1/6 to each side of the dice, just because the dice is 
symmetrical. Another one is atypicality: if we see a cat 
which is three standard deviations away in size from our 
prototype of cat, we consider it improbable. Yet another is 
provided by frequency estimates in time, in space or in 
any relevant dimension: if all the fires I witnessed were 
located kilometres away from my home, I infer a spatial 
density for such events that makes me consider a fire next 
block quite improbable. From a cognitive modelling 
perspective, it is not obvious that these modes of access to 
probability can be unified the way classical probability 
does it, i.e. using measure theory, distributions and basic 
axioms. 
Second, the foundations of classical probability theory 
are problematic from a cognitive modelling perspective. 
Authors like Franck Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti 
attempted to ground probability into intuition. They 
independently designed a procedure to found the concept 
of subjective probability (Gillies 2000). Their idea was to 
imagine an experiment, in which the subject is asked to 
bet on the event. The subject does not know in advance 
whether it is a bet in favour of the event or against it. The 
relative height of the bet happens to reflect the subject‟s 
estimate of the probability. Moreover, such estimates are 
shown to satisfy Kolmogorov‟s axioms. The problem is 
that all classical definitions of probability, including de 
Finetti and Ramsey‟s subjective probability, require 
explicit knowledge of all alternatives. De Finetti‟s 
provocative statement, “Probability does not exist”, 
claims that probability is grounded in the observer‟s 
ignorance, not in some objective knowledge (de Finetti 
1970). Though, the „subjective probability‟ framework 
still requires some objective reference. To assign a 
probability to a given event, one must know the complete 
set of alternatives. How can non-omniscient beings assign 
probability at all? 
Let us take an example. Suppose a reader notices an 
unexpected fact about the novel she is currently reading. 
All six paragraphs in the current page begin with the 
character „C‟. The fact may be perceived as unusual by 
that reader because, obviously, she considers that the page 
could or should have been otherwise. What is the set of 
alternatives there? Alternative capital letters, alternatives 
letters, alternative paragraphs, alternative pages, 
alternative novels? What does prevent the reader from 
being overwhelmed with irrelevant details when 
considering alternatives, such as paper irregularities, 
scattered tiny ink flecks and the like? After all, the actual 
page is unique, and thus highly improbable, due to many 
tiny details that can be discovered in it. Maybe in no other 
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printed page, in the history of humanity, did the four 
words „excited‟, „deep‟, „talked‟, „gone‟ appear one above 
the other on four adjacent lines. Though, this latter fact 
would appear exceedingly boring to most of us. And the 
reason lies in the cognitive perception of probability. The 
repeated character „C‟ at the beginning of all six 
paragraphs of the page appears more improbable than the 
vertical arrangement of four particular words. We must 
explain why. 
In what follows, we start from Solomonoff‟s definition 
of algorithmic complexity, and we adapt it to cognitive 
modelling purposes. Then we define unexpectedness and 
base a new definition of intuitive probability upon it. The 
prediction that human subjects will find unexpected 
structures improbable will be explored in a little 
exploratory experiment. Finally, we will discuss the 
generality of the notions introduced in this paper.  
A Structural Approach To Probability 
In the framework of algorithmic complexity developed by 
Ray Solomonoff, Andrey Kolmogorov and Gregory 
Chaitin, the probability of an object is defined in relation 
to the shortest available descriptions of that object. The 
epistemological shift is significant. Probability is no 
longer a measure of the subject‟s ignorance about the 
object, as in classical definitions. On the contrary, it 
depends on the subject‟s ability to describe the object. 
More precisely, the algorithmic probability PM(x) of an 
object x is given by (Solomonoff 1978): 
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This definition is relative to a given Turing machine M, 
and L(si) is the length of the i
th
 string that, given as input 
to that machine, outputs a string beginning with x.  is a 
normalisation coefficient that depends on M and on the 
size of x. This probability is well approximated by:  
 PM(x)  2
-K(x)
  (2) 
where K(x) is the Kolmogorov complexity of x.
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The concept of algorithmic probability captures the 
odds that a given device will spontaneously produce 
object x („spontaneously‟, in the case of a Turing machine, 
means: when given a random sequence as input). For this 
definition to be of any use in cognitive modelling, the 
machine M has to be replaced by some model of the 
human cognitive ability to analyse objects. In the spirit of 
the definition of algorithmic complexity, we may say that 
any realistic computational cognitive model would be 
appropriate, as the resulting definitions will only differ by 
the complexity of discrepancies between these models, 
which is expected to be small. 
We choose Michael Leyton‟s Generative Theory of 
Shape as reference model (Leyton 2001). According to 
Leyton, individuals analyse the structure of objects by 
constructing it as a multi-layered group. At each stage of 
this construction, a fiber group is transferred through a 
transfer group to give a higher-level structure. A 
                                                          
1 This is true only for large objects. A better approximation is 
given by replacing K(x) by KM(x), which is the shortest input of 
M that gives x as input. 
simplified version of this theory will allow us to compute 
de complexity of structures. Consider for instance the 
following numeric sequence: 
10  20  30  40  50  60  70 
This sequence does not appear as random to a human 
mind trained to read numbers. One possible generative 
description of this sequence is as follows: 
 
1. start with one 
uninstantiated number: 
– 
2. transfer it through 
translation: 
–   –   –   –   –   –   – 
3. the number is a 
duplicated digit: 
––  ––  ––  ––  ––  ––  ––  
4. instantiate the second 
digit: 
–0  –0  –0  –0  –0  –0  –0 
5. dissociate the  transfer 
operator: 
–0  –0  –0  –0  –0  –0  –0 
6. instantiate the first 
digit: 
10  20  30  40  50  60  70 
 
Several generative stories of minimal complexity can be 
proposed for the same structure, mainly by changing the 
order of the different phases (e.g. step 2 could be 
postponed after step 4). Valid generative sequences 
maximise transfer and recoverability (Leyton 2001). In 
step 5, the transfer operator cop which performed a mere 
translation in step 2 becomes a joint operator +1/cop, with 
one first component that increments its operand. 
To compute the complexity CR of the resulting 
structure, we propose to use the general formula: 
 CR = CF + CT (3) 
CF represents the complexity of the fiber group, while 
CT is the complexity of the transfer group. Moreover, the 
complexity of instantiating a number is given by: 
 Cn = log2 (n+1) (4) 
It represents the minimal information in bits to locate 
the number by its rank in the usual order.
2
 Some numbers 
may have a lower complexity. For instance, the number 
33333 results from the transfer of the digit 3, and its 
complexity is C3+Ccop+C5 rather than log(33334) (Ccop 
designates the complexity of the copy operation, and C5 is 
the complexity of stopping the copy after reaching 5 
terms). In our previous example, each step adds 
complexity: Ccop for step 2; Cdup for the duplication in 
step 3; 0 for the instantiation of step 4;
3
 Cdup + C+1 for 
splitting the transfer operator and instantiating the first 
component to the incrementing operator in step 5; and 
lastly C1=1 for step 6. We may consider that Cdup= Ccop 
and that C+n= Cn. The overall complexity is thus: CR = 
3Ccop+2 (we ignore that the sequence is bounded to seven 
elements, otherwise C7 must be added). 
                                                          
2 Definitions for the complexity of numbers may slightly vary, 
but those differences are irrelevant to our purpose here. 
3 The complexity of 0 is not necessarily 0, especially if it is 
perceived as following 9, in which case the complexity is 
rather 3.5. 
 3 
If we apply formula (2) with CR as a human estimate of 
K(x), we obtain a paradoxical result. Simple structures 
like 33333 turn out to be more probable than more 
“random” numbers such as, say, 28561, in flagrant 
contradiction with what human subjects consider to be the 
case (see below). The logic underlying definitions (1) and 
(2) is that simple structures are more likely to be produced 
by any constructive device than complex ones. This 
assumption does not capture the human perception of 
randomness and probability. 
In studying apparent randomness, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1972) observed that subjects require random 
sequences to be irregular. They mention that apparent 
randomness “is a form of complexity of structure”, as 
“random-appearing sequences are those whose verbal 
description is longest.” This observation is much in 
accordance with the modern definition of randomness, 
which is equivalent to the absence of structure (Chaitin 
2001). However, it is at odds with the above definition of 
algorithmic probability: a regular structure is simple to 
achieve for usual devices, and should be considered more 
probable. The problem comes from the fact that human 
beings consider probabilistic outcomes to be produced, 
not by simple deterministic devices, but by random, and 
thus complex, devices. Therefore, we are not interested in 
some objective probability of the existence of an object, 
but in the probability of its occurrence as output of a 
complex machine. This is what the notion of 
unexpectedness captures. 
Unexpectedness 
To account for some important aspects of subjective 
randomness, we introduce the notion of unexpectedness as 
follows. 
 U(x) = Cexp(x) – Cobs(x) (5) 
where Cexp is the expected complexity of object x and Cobs 
is its actual, observed complexity. Let us explain the 
concept with an example. 
If one is given a five-digit number, one expects a 
complexity Cexp = Ccop+5log(10), as a typical number 
results from a generative process such as (i) copy an 
uninstantiated digit; (ii) instantiate the five digits 
independently, after the copy, by choosing among ten 
possibilities. This is probably the complexity that will be 
assigned to 28561 by most subjects. If subjects observe 
that the given number happens to be 33333, they are 
surprised. This comes from the fact that 33333 results 
from a simpler process, of complexity log(10)+Ccop, as the 
instantiation now occurs before the copy. The amount of 
surprise is given by U = 4log(10). Such a surprise is 
generally accompanied by a feeling of improbability 
(Dessalles, to appear). For instance, children may become 
excited and feel compelled to signal the event when their 
parents‟ car reaches 33333 on the clock. To capture this 
phenomenon, we define subjective probability as follows. 
 p(x) = 2
-U(x)
  (6) 
In our example, we get p=10
–4
, which corresponds to 
the mathematical probability of observing a number with 
five identical digits. We propose that subjective 
probabilities defined by (6) provide an adequate picture of 
the way human individuals perceive probability.
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 We 
designed a small experiment to test the validity of this 
claim. 
The Lottery Experiment 
We performed a few tests on a small set of subjects as a 
pilot experiment to test our model. Subjects informally 
approached in a café were offered a free French Lottery 
bulletin. They just had to choose 2 among 14 possible 
combinations of six numbers ranging from 1 to 49 to try 
their luck. Among these combinations, ten were fixed and 
four were randomly generated anew for each subject. The 
resulting lists of combinations were randomly shuffled to 
avoid artefacts due to the order of presentation. Some of 
the combinations offered to all the subjects, such as [1 2 3 
4 5 6], [10 11 12 44 45 46], [10 20 30 31 32 33], [34 35 
36 37 38 39], were chosen for their low complexity. Some 
others were the output of a random generator. 
Twenty-six subjects were tested. Though all 
combinations are obviously equally likely to win, all 
subjects showed strong avoidance of the two simplest 
ones, namely [1 2 3 4 5 6] and [34 35 36 37 38 39]. When 
asked, all subjects expressed their strong feeling that these 
combinations were virtually impossible. Typical 
comments were „If you play that one, it‟s sure you won't 
win‟ or „It would be stupid to play that one‟. There is only 
3.10
–4
 probability that the 26 subjects would have 
consistently missed these two combinations if they had 
chosen randomly. This result is consistent with findings 
about the avoidance of highly regular structures by lottery 
players (Savoie & Ladouceur 1995). It is also consistent 
with our claim that subjects spontaneously estimate 
probability through a difference of structural complexity. 
When the actual structure is too simple, the probability is 
perceived as too low for the event to have any chance to 
occur. By contrast, when the structure is complex enough, 
as for [6 17 21 28 37 42], subjects have no problem 
choosing the combination. 
Though this pilot study is by far insufficient to give 
reliable results, we tried to estimate how far its results 
complied with the predictions of formula (6). To do so, 
we wrote a small computer programme in Prolog to assess 
the complexity of combinations. The programme 
maintains a “short-term memory”, implemented as a list 
of four items maximum, which contains the last numbers 
or operations that were processed. The only operations 
taken into account are +1 and +2 increments. To 
reproduce the principle of formula (3), elements that are 
present in short-term memory are considered “free”. Two 
sequences like 3 4 and 3 4 5 6 7 are thus of same 
complexity, since the last processed number and the +1 
operation are always on top of the short-term memory. 
The programme detects increments, assigns intrinsic 
complexity to digits, and processes tenths and units 
                                                          
4 Note that in general, it is difficult to verify that subjective 
probabilities, as defined by (6), comply with Kolmogorov 
axioms, as they concern events that are not incompatible. For 
instance, the expected event of five non-related digits is given 
probability 1, but it includes all more particular events such as 
33333. 
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independently if no global increment was previously 
detected. Though various details of the programme are 
necessarily arbitrary, they are of no consequence on the 
overall ranking of structures. Table 1 gives the simplest 
structures of the sample and their complexity as computed 
by the programme. 
 
Table 1:  Simple lottery structures of the sample. 
 
Combinations Complexity 
1  2  3  4  5  6 3 
34 35 36 37 38 39 6 
10 11 12 44 45 46 11 
7  8  9  37 38 39 12 
8  9  26 27 28 29 12 
10 20 30 31 32 33 12 
1  2  5  6  15 49 14 
. . . . . . 
14 24 36 38 42 44 26 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the combinations 
chosen by subjects according to their complexity. Note the 
total absence of low complexity structures (under 7). 
Though the pattern is globally compatible with our 
expectations, we may be surprised by the high score of 
structures with complexity between 9 and 12. It is likely 
that a few subjects did not pay attention to the kind 
patterns that appear on table 1. Some among them did not 
attempt to maximize the intuitive probability, but applied 
various alternative strategies, such as choosing 
combinations that are related to their personal life. For 
instance, one of them declared he chose combination [10 
20 30 31 32 33] just because the last number was the area 
code of his mate‟s birth location. Another indicated that 
he chose [8  9  26 27 28 29] because of the two first digits 
correspond to his birthday. 
Obviously, the test cannot properly function with 
individuals who are aware of the equiprobability of all 
combinations. When informally testing colleagues or 
engineering students, we invariably obtained explicit blind 
strategies („just take the first two ones‟) or meta-strategies 
(„I choose [1 2 3 4 5 6] to maximize my gain expectancy, 
as nobody will play it‟). By contrast, none of the 26 
subjects of the sample seems to have applied such 
mathematically informed strategy.  
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Figure 1:  Distribution of chosen structures  
according to complexity. 
 
This preliminary study provides nothing more than a 
hint that formula (6) may give a relevant estimate of 
subjective probabilities. We are planning a new 
experiment that will correct the shortcomings of this one. 
In particular, subjects will be made aware of sequential 
patterns and other conspicuous structures by being shown 
the Lotto grids as they will be played, together with 
corresponding combinations in numeric form. Moreover, 
we plan to investigate the remarkable influence of 
mathematical instruction on the subjects‟ choices. 
Discussion 
The outcomes of this preliminary study cannot be 
considered as validated results, and our next experiments 
with subjects will require significant improvement. 
However, it demonstrates that the phenomenon is real, 
that individuals base their judgement concerning 
probability on various cognitive factors, which include 
structure. It is not absolute structure that is relevant, but 
unexpected structure, i.e. structure that is less complex 
than anticipated. 
It can be objected that the definition of probability 
given by formula (6) has no reliable character, as it 
crucially depends on the observer. For instance, as 
number like 28561 will appear random to most subjects, 
while a few of them will consider it as very peculiar, 
because they recognise the fourth power of 13. What 
would be a drawback for mathematical theorising (for 
instance, the French Lottery administration should ignore 
the structure of drawings) proves fundamental for 
cognitive modelling. Structure is indeed the only way to 
understand why subjects are confident in assigning highly 
diverging values of probability in the absence of any 
objective reason to do so. It also explains how individuals 
are able to assign probability to events when the set of 
alternatives is not defined in advance.  
The little experiment on the Lottery reveals what many 
would consider as a bias. Most individuals, especially if 
they had no training in mathematical probability, fail to 
recognise the fact that a combination like [1 2 3 4 5 6] has 
no less chances to be drawn than [6 17 21 28 37 42] when 
it comes to making a betting choice. Such „errors‟ seem to 
demonstrate that aspects of human cognition are 
maladaptive. 
In (Dessalles, to appear), we show that one of the main 
occasions on which individuals attend to unexpected 
states of affairs is to signal them in conversation. For 
instance, in the middle of a discussion between four 
people, one participant interrupted the conversation to 
observe that her three companions were wearing purple 
shirts. The unexpected decrease of complexity, as the set 
of purple shirts formed a simpler structure than usually 
observed within such a group, urged the young woman to 
make her conversational move. It is not structure per se, 
but rather the fact that she could observe an unexpected 
transfer (in the Leyton sense), that prompted her 
utterance.  
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A possible explanation for this sensitivity to structural 
complexity drop is that it may be advantageous in normal 
life, as unexpected structure is quite often correlated to 
hidden causality. Situations like National Lottery, in 
which honesty is guaranteed by law, are unlikely to occur 
in spontaneous settings. If [1 2 3 4 5 6] had been drawn on 
the very first day when National Lottery was created, 
most people, including mathematicians, would have been 
intrigued and would have suspected some hidden causality 
such as malfunction or malpractice, even if that drawing 
was as probable as any other, and no less probable than 
the actual drawing that elicited no suspicious reaction. 
More generally, we may wonder to what extent 
unexpectedness, as defined by (5), is a relevant base for 
defining subjective probability. One of difficulty in 
modelling probability is to account for the fact that the 
same sense of improbability accompanies apparently 
unrelated phenomena, such as unexpected remarkable 
structures, atypicality and unexpected proximity. Formula 
(6) may provide a suitable answer. If we take into account 
the complexity of individuation of situations, then formula 
(6) offers a unified account of what people would consider 
improbable. A Lottery drawing like [1 2 3 4 5 6], which is 
remarkable by its unexpected low structural complexity, is 
easy to individuate within the set of usual drawings;
5
 a 
one metre tall dog is much easier to individuate that a 
standard dog; the exact location of a fire that occurred in 
the immediate vicinity is easier to individuate than the 
location of remembered fires, which occurred tenths of 
kilometres away. In each case, the complexity of 
individuation is measurable. It corresponds to the length 
of the shortest ideal description that allows distinguishing 
the situation from any other possible situation. When this 
complexity is lower than usual, a feeling of improbability 
ensues, and its amplitude is predicted by formula (6). The 
same account in terms of complexity drop thus obtains for 
the various cognitive sources of improbability, while they 
were merely artificially merged in classical theories. 
Perspectives 
As already mentioned, much additional work is needed 
to validate the model by observing the way individuals 
behave when dealing with randomness and improbability. 
On the computer modelling side, we are currently working 
on algorithms that would offer a more faithful computer 
implementation of Leyton‟s principles. The difficulty lies 
in the programme‟s ability to detect operators that, when 
applied, diminish the complexity of the actual structure. 
Moreover, those operators must be cognitively plausible. 
The difficulty is that some operations may be easily 
detected by the computer and not by human subjects, and 
conversely. For instance, it is not obvious for subjects that 
the sequence 7 13 18 24 31 39 is remarkable because the 
gap between numbers is incremented; on the other hand, 
the mirror structure of a sequence like 
2 14 29 35 35 29 14 2 is conspicuous to most subjects, but 
is not obvious for the computer to detect if it was not 
                                                          
5 It is a general result of algorithmic complexity theory that 
the number of simple structures of given size tends to be 
negligible in comparison to complex structures of the same size 
when that size increases (Li & Vitanyi 1993). 
specifically programmed to do it. The sequence possesses 
Leytonian structure, as the pattern 2 14 29 35 is 
transferred through the symmetry group. The problem is 
that if the programme is given a variety of operators, we 
may face a combinatorial explosion when searching for 
existing transfers in the input structure. 
Grounding subjective probability in unexpectedness 
offers new perspectives on probabilistic reasoning. It 
obviously provides a new and quantifiable interpretation 
of some probabilistic biases that were attributed to 
representativeness (Kahneman & Tversky 1972). It also 
accounts for the fact that human beings can assign low 
probability to unique events, without considering the set 
of alternatives, and it makes non trivial predictions on the 
influence of parameters like distance or recency on 
newsworthiness (Dessalles, in preparation).  
The scope of the notion of unexpectedness, as it has 
been defined here as a difference of cognitive complexity, 
goes beyond the sole definition of intuitive probability. 
Unexpectedness is involved in what makes the interest of 
conversational narratives (Dessalles, in preparation), and 
in the definition of emergence (Dessalles & Phan 2005). 
Cognitive complexity, understood by analogy with 
Kolmogorov‟s definition, as the shortest ideal description, 
available to human cognition, of perceived objects or 
scenes, could prove to be an important notion of cognitive 
modelling. 
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